I originally posted the following to talk.politics.guns on February 29th, 2000.

A great deal of debate has centered on the phrase 'A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State', in the Second Amendment to the US Constitution.  Those who are arguing for more restrictions on firearms generally argue that this phrase limits the right to bear arms to those who are in a well-regulated militia, and claim that this is synonymous with a militia under government control, and claim that this means the modern day National Guard.  Those arguing against further restrictions, and for the repeal of at least some current restrictions, frequently point to early dictionaries referring to well-regulated clocks, appetites, and shotgun bores, in which the term means 'properly functioning' or 'properly aligned'.  Well  to make life MORE fun, I've found several places in the early Congressional debates, contemperaneous with the adoption of the Second Amendment, where the term was used in reference to a 'well-regulated government'.  The only editing I have done is for the purpose of fitting within a posting, but I've noticed one or two places where the Library of Congress'  OCR software goofed (arc instead of are, for instance), and left those intact.  Scanned images of the documents are available at the Library of Congress site, in addition to the OCR version I copied this from.

Enjoy!

The original usage I found when looking up something else, in the records of the early Congressional debates as found at thomas.loc.gov.  This is from page 314 of The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Elliot's Debates):

It is further said, that the operation of local interests should be counteracted; for which purpose the Senate should be rendered permanent. I conceive that the true interest of every state is the interest of the whole; and that, if we should have a well-regulated government, this idea will prevail. We shall indeed, have few local interests to pursue, under the new Constitution, because it limits the claims of the states by so close a line, that on their part there can be but little dispute, and little worth disputing about. But, sir, I conceive that partial interests will grow continually weaker, because there are not those fundamental differences between the real interests of the several states, which will long prevent their coming together, and becoming uniform. Another argument advanced by the gentlemen is, that our amendment would be the means of producing factions among the electors; that aspiring men would misrepresent the conduct of a faithful senator, and by intrigue procure a recall upon false grounds, in order to make room for themselves. But, sir, men who are ambitious for places will rarely be disposed to render those places unstable. A truly ambitious man will never do this, unless he is mad. It is not to be supposed that a state will recall a man once in twenty years, to make way for another. Dangers of this kind arc very remote: I think they ought not to be brought seriously into view.

Another usage I found from the Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, from Monday, January 31, 1785, p.26:

"Mr. [Jacob] Read, to whom was referred a letter from the Comptroller of the treasury with its enclosures stating that a number of the Certificates issued by John Pierce Commissioner for liquidating the Claims of the Army, had been counterfeited: beg leave to submit the following report. That the honor as well as the interest of the federal government requires that the most efficacious measures should be taken to discover the persons who have been guilty of the said forgery, to the end that an Act which the laws of all well regulated governments have marked as an offence may in future be prevented, its injurious effects both to the United States and its Citizens as far as possible restrained, and the Mischievous and wicked Authors of it brought to punishment.--Whereupon resolved, that, the Comptroller be required to trace the said certificates as far back as possible through their several possessors on their progress to the Treasury.

And another usage:

We are told that both sides are distinguished by these great traits, confidence and distrust. Perhaps there may be a less or greater tincture of suspicion on one side than the other. But give me leave to say that, where power can be safely lodged, if it be necessary, reason commands its cession.  In such case, it is imprudent and unsafe to withhold it. It is universally admitted that it must be lodged in some hands or other. The question, then, is, in what part of the government it ought to be placed; and not whether any other political body, independent of the government, should have it or not. I profess myself to have had a uniform zeal for a republican government. If the honorable member, or any other person, conceives that my attachment to this system arises from a different source, he is greatly mistaken. From the first moment that my mind was capable of contemplating political subjects, I never, till this moment, ceased wishing success to a well-regulated republican government. The establishment of such in America was my most ardent desire. I have considered attentively (and my consideration has been aided by experience) the tendency of a relaxation of laws and a licentiousness of manners.

From p. 394 of Elliot's Debates -- Saturday, June 14, 1788, in a discussion over how the powers over the militia should best be distributed.

Again, all of this was found at thomas.loc.gov (actually,
lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html).